John Bolton and the US Retreat from International Law by Haslam, Emily & Mansell, Wade
Kent Academic Repository – Kent Law School 
Published version available in Social Legal Studies 14:459 
- 1 - 
 
 
John Bolton and the United States' Retreat from 
International Law 
Emily Haslam & Wade Mansell  
  
Social Legal Studies 14:459 (2005) 
 
Not Published Version 
 
  
Abstract: This article focuses upon the writings of John R. Bolton who was for four 
years US Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International 
Security. He is currently the US Ambassador to the United Nations. His 
position with regard to international law is, at least for non-Americans, 
extraordinary, but also extraordinarily important since it resonates with the 
views of many in the current Bush administration. In essence, he is sceptical 
of the entire category of international law and argues that it cannot ever be 
accepted as superior to US domestic law. He doubts that it can be 
distinguished from international relations. These views need to be taken 
seriously if the implications for the world of diplomacy and international 
relations, and indeed domestic law, are to be understood. This the article 
attempts to do. 
Keywords:  




This article takes as its focus the writings of John R. Bolton, who 
when we first became interested in him was US Under-Secretary of 
State for Arms Control and International Security, a position he 
held from May 2001. At the time of writing he has just become the US 
Ambassador to the United Nations. At first sight, at least to a European 
critic, Bolton might seem to come from what could be labelled the ‘Redneck 
School of American Jurisprudence’ – certainly at least with his writings on 
international law (though to so label it is to prejudge an argument Bolton 
wants to have). But although Bolton is the focus of this article, he is not its 
sole justification. It is because much of what Bolton has to say is representative 
of many other legal writers, and particularly members of the current 
Bush administration, that it demands serious attention and consideration. 
Those whose views are similar are often subsumed within the label of ‘neoconservatives’, 
and it will be necessary to allude to writings from this group 
in order to illustrate the breadth of support Bolton’s writings command. (For 
a useful discussion of neo-conservatism generally, see Halper and Clarke 
(2004), J. Murphy (2004), Reus-Smit (2004) and Hamm (2005).) 
At first sight it might seem that in Bolton’s broadest attacks on international 
law he is simply attempting to re-fight battles long lost. Writing of 
international law in 1880 the Encyclopaedia Britannica entry reads: 
International Law is the name now generally given to the rules of conduct 
accepted as binding [between themselves] by the nations – or at all events the 
civilized nations – of the world. International law as a whole is capable of being 
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very differently interpreted according to the point of view from which it is 
regarded, and its rules vary infinitely in point of certainty and acceptance. 
According to the ideas of the leading school of jurists it is an impropriety to 
speak of these rules as being laws; – they are merely moral principles, – positive, 
it is true, in the sense that they are recognised in fact, but destitute of the sanctioning 
force which is the distinguishing quality of law. (Volume XIII: 190) 
Such a position remains very much the view of Bolton. But while the 1880 
author had the grace to add that the problem with that proposition is that it 
may ‘unduly depreciate the actual force and effect of the system as a whole’, 
John Bolton would accept no such qualification. For him the legal positivism 
of the Austinian kind is an obvious truth with significant implications for 
international ‘law’ and its influence on US policies generally and (for exemplification 
purposes in this article) on the attitudes of the US administration 
to human rights in particular. 
Before presenting the relevant Boltonian arguments it is necessary to make 
some suggestions about why his views resonate so easily with those of a large 
section of the US public for whom Bolton claims to speak. He is very much 
a populist (not an easy thing to be in American jurisprudence), and one 
cannot but suspect that there is much in what he says when he observed in 
one address the gap between ordinary US citizens and a ‘committed 
minority’ in the appreciation of the US and its place in the world: 
Even the apparently simple act of entitling a conference ‘Trends in Global 
Governance: Do They Threaten American Sovereignty?’ is likely to expose the 
vast disparities which exist between two quite different factions within the 
United States. One party, small but highly educated, voluble and tireless, knows 
instinctively (and often emotionally) what global governance is and why it is 
desirable. Consisting of academics (largely, but not exclusively, law and international 
relations professors) and media professionals; members of self-styled 
human rights, environmental and humanitarian groups; rarified circles within 
the ‘permanent government,’ and at present even in the [Clinton] White House; 
and a diverse collection of people generally uneasy with the dominance of capitalism 
as an economic philosophy and individualism as a political philosophy, 
these ‘Globalists’ find allies all around the world. Their agenda is unambiguously 
statist, but typically on a worldwide rather than a national level. 
The other faction, consisting silently of virtually everyone else in the United 
States, has no clue as to whether that ‘global governance’ is even an issue worth 
discussing, since, among other things, it has formed no part of any political 
campaign in recent memory. This large party cannot define global governance, 
does not think about it, and – when it is explained – typically rejects it unhesitatingly. 
Although overwhelmingly predominant numerically, these Americans 
(who are comfortable with individualism and capitalism) are little recognized 
abroad, lost from view beneath the prolific production of academic papers, 
endless international conferences, and international media appearances of the 
diverse and often contradictory views of those whose primary urge, if not their 
ultimate objective, enrolls them in the party of global governance. Accordingly, 
when the ‘Americanists’ speak out, foreigners often assume that they are simply 
the knee-jerk voice of reaction, the great unlettered and unwashed, whom the 
cultured and educated Globalists simply have not yet got under proper control. 
Europeans in particular will instantly recognize the disjunction between elite 
and mass political opinions that has characterized their societies for almost their 
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entire democratic experience, and they will empathize, needless to say, with 
their elite, Globalist counterparts. (Bolton, 2000a: 205) 
In holding such views it is important to remember that not only is Bolton 
far from alone, but he is a part of a mainstream historical tradition that has 
long debated the extent and desirability of US engagement in world affairs. 
Even though the necessity of such engagement is now conceded, the terms 
are still a matter of vigorous debate. If isolationism is no longer a respectable 
political position, the level and type of engagement remain at large and even 
since the Second World War have manifested themselves in disagreement 
over quite what the United Nations means to the USA, and what the USA 
means to the UN – a disagreement apparent most obviously in the debate 
over US funding contributions to the UN, considered further later. More 
fundamentally the debate has been about attitudes to globalization, but less 
economic globalization than political, as will be seen. 
To many Europeans such debates seem scarcely credible. The world is 
seemingly now so obviously interconnected (a feeling greatly enhanced by 
the reality of the European Union) that the notion of one state being outside 
of the international community and its rules is unthinkable. Why might 
ordinary US citizens and their ‘Jesse Helms type’ representatives beg to 
differ? Why might they want to claim exemption from the rules of international 
law? There are, in our view, strong historical reasons which Europeans 
ignore at their peril as to why Boltonian Americans might consider 
that international law must on occasions apply to every state but the US, 
which should (in the eyes of such Americans) be unconstrained. 
A ‘Boltonian’ thumbnail sketch of the development of international law, 
directed towards explaining why the USA must be unconstrained in its 
endeavours to use its overwhelming strength for the good of itself first, and 
for the good of the world second, might be roughly as follows: 
Let us first of all remember that we live in a world largely constructed by 18thand 
19th- and 20th-century Europeans. They it was who through their policies 
of colonial expansion, whether intentionally or not, whether well intended or 
not, redefined the world in terms of spaces, territories and nascent states in a 
way which haunts us yet. The careless drawing of boundaries in Africa (to put 
it no higher); negligent colonial administration, not to mention a tradition of 
slave trading; have condemned that Continent to almost incessant fratricidal 
violence. In the Middle East it was Europeans who combined Sunnis, Shias 
and Kurds into one unlikely entity, it was they who drew boundaries 
bringing wealth to the few (Kuwaitis, Gulf States and Saudi Arabian populations); 
and poverty to the many. It was they who both persecuted and 
murdered their Jewish populations then sought to assuage their guilt by 
creating a land for them far away and in other people’s homes. It was they 
who indulged in a meaningless and absurd First World War, (and not really 
a World War at all unless you are European), finally resolved only by US 
intervention and sacrifice; but yet also leading to that most inhumane system 
of government yet invented, ludicrously titled by those who knew nothing, 
‘communist’. A system finally overthrown after Ronald Reagan refused to 
accept the co-existence compromises a pusillanimous Europe demanded, and 
made their corrupt system unworkable. It was Europe where the Second 
World War began, once more resolved only with US intervention and sacrifice. 
It was Europe on its economic knees, which revived only with US 
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economic and political help. 
There is a further irony. At a time when European states dominated the 
world, the only international law they respected was designed to further their 
nefarious activities and legitimate their explicit domination of all peoples everywhere. 
Not for 19th-century Europe proscription on international intervention. 
Not for them a requirement that in enforcing ‘order’ they act with 
humanity and within the rule of law. Not for them the requirement to respect 
other religions or belief systems. Certainly not! For them might was right, 
civilization was European and the European anthropologists confirmed 
European racial superiority. 
You can begin to get the drift of the Boltonian argument. And it might 
continue: 
Is the final legacy of this degenerate, oppressive and cruel epoch of European 
superiority to be a system of rules (which Europe itself is too weak to enforce) 
designed to ensure the continuing moral superiority of Europe? Are the 
constraints preventing intervention in order to improve the lot of the people 
(as in Iraq), to be subject to rules of non-intervention intended in their design 
to prevent further European aggression and fratricide? How ironic!1 
Thus, when the United Nations, itself very much a product of US draftsmanship, 
was created in the wake of the most recent European fratricide, 
albeit that the cause was the rise of fascism and national socialism, no doubt 
much of the Charter was drafted with this in mind, and equally without 
doubt it certainly was not drafted with the intention of shackling the foreign 
policy of the United States (Schlesinger, 2003). And although the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (sometimes referred to as ‘Eleanor 
Roosevelt’s Declaration’) was not intended to have legal effect, in reflecting 
the four freedoms proclaimed by the USA and the UK in the Atlantic 
Charter, its ideology too was thought to reflect US ideology in a way that 
would not constrain US actions at home or abroad (Morton, 1943; Simpson, 
2001). 
This is the background against which neo-conservatism, at least in its 
foreign policy aspects must be understood. With isolationism no longer 
viable as foreign policy (Bolton, 2000b) there was a growing body of opinion 
of the view that nevertheless so different was the USA from all other states 
that some form of ‘exceptionalism’ (on which see Koh (2003)) was not only 
desirable but inevitable.2 In something of an irony the writing of Hans 
Morgenthau could be quoted in aid of this view. When Morgenthau (1960) 
wrote of international law,3 he quoted with approval Oppenheim’s (1912) 
statement in his book to the effect that it is of the essence of international 
law that there is both community of interest and a balance of power without 
which there can be no international law. The balance of power, says Morgenthau, 
according to Oppenheim is ‘an indispensable condition of the very 
existence of international law’ (Morgenthau, 1960: 278). And Oppenheim 
(1912) continued: 
Six morals can be deduced from the history of the development of the Law of 
Nations: 
1) The first and principal moral is that a Law of Nations can exist only if 
there be an equilibrium, a balance of power, between the members of the 
Family of Nations. If the Powers cannot keep one another in check, no rules 
of law will have any force, since an over-powerful State will naturally try to 
Kent Academic Repository – Kent Law School 
Published version available in Social Legal Studies 14:459 
- 5 - 
 
 
act according to discretion and disobey the law. As there is not and never can 
be a central political authority above the Sovereign States that could enforce 
the rules of the Law of Nations, a balance of power must prevent any 
member of the Family of Nations from becoming omnipotent. (p. 193) 
Although a footnote observes that editions of Oppenheim, post-1912 
omitted this statement, there is little doubt that Morgenthau continued to 
accept it. Given that international law is, as Rosenne (1984) put it: ‘a system 
of co-ordination, rather than subordination’ (p. 2), it is dependent upon, at 
the very least, the formal equality of states.4 If one state is in a position, or 
believes itself to be in a position to act unilaterally without fear of the consequences, 
the force of law seems to have disappeared. The United States, the 
neo-conservatives have argued, is now in this position. 
It has been accurately observed that as early as 1992 with the so-called 
Defense Planning Guidance Draft, a confidential document leaked to the 
press (Gellman, 1992), drafted under the supervision of Paul Wolfowitz and 
subsequently revised and muted by Dick Cheney, the Defense Secretary, the 
idea was introduced that the USA was now uniquely strong enough to be 
able to contemplate with equanimity unilateral military action, the preemptive 
use of force and ‘the maintenance of a US nuclear arsenal strong 
enough to deter the development of nuclear programmes elsewhere’ 
(Hoffman, 2003). As Hoffmann points out, what that document did not do 
was to explain how such policies might be reconcilable with the many international 
agreements and obligations the USA had voluntarily undertaken 
since the Second World War. 
With the Project for the New American Century’s letter to then President 
Clinton in 19975 arguing for unilateral action to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s 
regime in Iraq, regardless of a lack of unanimity among the Veto powers in 
the Security Council, the Defense Planning Guidance Draft came into its 
own after 11 September 2001. In The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of September 2002, published under the seal of the White House, it 
was asserted that the United States now claimed the right of pre-emptive 
action, leaving the limitations on the international use of force in the UN 
Charter in utter disarray. And while claiming this right, it was asserted that 
the ‘United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits 
of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of 
democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the 
world’ (p. 2).6 
Such documents, themselves reflecting a reconsideration of US attitudes to 
international law, even if John Bolton had no part in their drafting, are 
certainly consistent with his expressed views to which we now turn. In order 
to do so we want to concentrate upon, and critically elucidate his views, first, 
upon ‘Globalism’ and global governance, second, upon his attitude to international 
law generally and his view of US treaty obligations particularly, and 
then to exemplify the implications of such views by considering their role in 
contemporary aspects of US human rights policy. And while the Bolton view 
of the International Criminal Court is relevant to this article, it is mainly so 
for what it implies over and beyond the human rights importance of that 
Court. 
 
BOLTON’S ARGUMENTS AGAINST ‘GLOBALISM’ 
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We have already quoted Bolton’s views of global governance. As may be 
noted, ‘he’s against it’! But what is it to which he is opposed? It is not globalization 
as such to which he objects. He specifically excludes from his objections 
‘what people do in their private capacities’ (Bolton, 2000a: 206) in which 
he includes business, commerce, religion and culture. Rather it is the action 
of ‘Globalists’ in advancing ‘their agenda’ and colonizing or appropriating 
‘substantive field after field – human rights, labor, health, the environment, 
political military affairs, and international organizations – the Globalists have 
been advancing while the Americanists have slept’ (p. 206). What is intolerable 
to Bolton is that the intention, sometimes explicit but always implicit, 
of such globalizing attempts is to constrain the United States.7 This concern 
underlies all Bolton’s writings. Such constraints are unacceptable because the 
power of the USA means it need defer to no other entity. His specific 
complaints concern first the idea that the international use of force is only 
legitimate when exercised pursuant to the UN Charter8 because the Security 
Council is argued to be the sole source of legitimacy for such action. Second, 
he objects to international agreements seeking to define acceptable (or unacceptable) 
weaponry, and in particular and for example, the 1997 International 
Land Mines Convention because of the potential to remove from 
US decision making and jurisdiction an important option, albeit one that 
might never be used. 
Third, and in a related way, he saw the negotiated and signed Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty (rejected by the Senate in October 1999), not necessarily 
as objectionable in itself (though quite possibly so) but objectionable 
again because it was depriving the US of the freedom to take decisions in the 
future dictated only by its own interests. When the ratification was defeated, 
the Clinton administration stated that pursuant to Article 18 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, it would not, as an unratified signatory, 
take any actions that would frustrate the intent of the treaty prior to its 
ratification. What incensed Bolton was that while the President of the USA 
was clearly empowered within that country to act in a way consistent with 
the provisions of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, notwithstanding its 
lack of ratification, to attribute such conduct to the unratified (by the US) 
Vienna Convention rather than to his constitutional authority, needlessly 
accepted external constraints upon conduct rather than asserting constitutional 
(domestic) supremacy. 
What we see so far looks very much like an assertion of American exceptionalism. 
The USA must be free to act in a way which its citizens democratically 
determine. Every attempt to constrain through external agreement 
moves authority away from the Constitution to the international community 
whose interests may not coincide with those of the USA. Why fetter future 
governments and, arguably, unconstitutionally hand power to outsiders? 
Implicit in this argument is the exalted and elevated status of the US Constitution, 
than which no greater authority apparently exists. We shall return to 
this point. 
Bolton’s fourth complaint about the Globalists is what he calls ‘Limiting 
the United States under human rights cover’, and this is intimately related to 
the final section of this article. Here he perceives two major dangers. On the 
one hand ‘the Globalists’ are intent on creating human rights standards 
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through international law with the aim of ‘removing them from common 
political processes, and in effect [superseding] national constitutional standards 
with international ones’ (Bolton, 2000a: 212). The claimed aim is to 
dictate to the US and also, with the growing use of ‘universal jurisdiction’,9 
to threaten US citizens outside of the USA with criminal prosecutions for 
breaches of international law.10 
On the other hand Bolton fears that much of the action of the Globalists 
in human rights promotion is aimed directly at the USA. He openly accepts 
that this is aimed at ‘American exceptionalism’, a concept with which he is 
entirely comfortable. His example, perhaps not an easy one for European 
eyes, concerns the use by the USA of the death penalty. He cannot accept 
that a body such as the United Nations, and specifically the UN Human 
Rights Commission should have any views upon the US exercise of a punishment 
accepted as constitutional and democratically approved. His reaction 
to a ‘forty page, single-spaced, heavily footnoted report’ of a Senegalese death 
penalty rapporteur is scathing and dismissive. The Rapporteur was unsurprisingly 
critical of the USA (Ndiaye, 1996) to which Bolton (2000a) 
responds: 
Most Americans will wonder how the UN arrived at such a position, so 
fundamentally 
different from our clearly-expressed democratic choice, without our 
knowing about it. They will also wonder how and when the United Nations 
ever came to believe it had the authority to make such judgments in the first 
place. The real agenda of the rapporteur and his allies, of course, is to leverage 
the stature and legal authority of the United Nations (such as they are), into 
our domestic debate, an effort most Americans would find fundamentally 
illegitimate. (p. 215) 
The penultimate objection to the Globalists is the rise of international 
Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs). While many people see these as 
a manifestation of participatory democracy, Bolton sees them as exactly the 
opposite – pressure groups without a democratic mandate concerned to 
judicialize various issues and thus remove them ‘from the purview of 
national politics’. He sees these NGOs as competing, sometimes on equal 
terms with states, in the major international organizations and particularly 
in the UN.11 Further they operate in opposition sometimes even to the state 
from whence they come or where they are based. The effect, it is argued, is 
to subvert the national democratic order by having a voice in international 
fora which may well have been defeated in national debate. Unsuccessful 
national and international pressure groups, usually representing minority 
causes, are yet able to achieve the same platform as state governments which 
are democratically elected. The effect may be to have to re-run debates lost 
nationally, internationally. 
This argument is one shared with many conservatives. Kenneth Anderson 
in particular has vehemently argued for clarification of NGO status. Not 
only does he reinforce Bolton’s view, but he also argues that the NGO threat 
to democratic processes and legitimacy is aggravated by the uses to which 
they are put by international organizations. There is, he suggests, a symbiotic 
relationship (and an unhealthy one) between international organizations 
and NGOs. International organizations, whether the UN and its organs, the 
WTO, the World Bank, or the IMF, or any other, suffer from a lack of all but 
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the most indirect democratic legitimacy. By paying heed to NGOs and 
granting them a status in discussion and policy formulation, international 
organizations use them to foster the illusion of democratic participation, 
accountability and legitimacy. By responding to NGOs, rather than to state 
governments the argument made is that this is profoundly undemocratic 
(Anderson, 2000, 2001). (For a contrary view see Glasius, 2002.) 
There is of course an element of truth in this argument. When one looks 
at the participants in the Rome Conference who drafted the Charter for the 
International Criminal Court, one sees significant activity from international 
human rights groups. But although they had a significant influence, they 
were not finally the decision makers. Their position was closely akin to 
internal lobbyists in the USA. Their influence may easily be exaggerated. 
Lastly, Bolton fears that much of the Globalists’ agenda is aimed directly 
or indirectly at curbing the power of the US by effectively transferring some 
of the sovereignty of the US to worldwide institutions and norms. From the 
New International Economic Order (originating in the UN General 
Assembly Resolution ‘Declaration and Programme of Action on the Establishment 
of a New International Economic Order’ (GAR 3201 and 3202, 1 
May 1974)) to UNESCO, to UNCTAD Bolton sees a continued attempt to 
regulate the world in a way not necessarily consistent, and often indeed 
designed to be inconsistent, with US interests and freedom. Recent attempts 
at such international perfidy in his view include the Kyoto Protocol on 
Climate Change, World Health Organization preoccupation first with breast 
milk and now with tobacco control, the International Labour Organization 
and ‘labor’ standards. ‘In short, for every area of public policy, there is a 
Globalist proposal, consistent with the overall objective of reducing individual 
nation-state autonomy, particularly that of the United States’ (Bolton, 
2000a: 220). The price of such Globalism, he concludes, is that: 
The costs to the United States – reduced constitutional autonomy, impaired 
popular sovereignty, reduction of our international power, and limitations on 
our domestic and foreign policy options and solutions – are far too great, and 
the current understanding of these costs far too limited to be acceptable. 
(p. 221) 
 
BOLTON AND AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM 
 
Harold Hongju Koh (2003) sought to analyse the content and significance of 
American exceptionalism. Before considering the relevance of this analysis 
some preliminary comments are called for. The concept of exceptionalism 
seems to have two broad meanings. The first, which relates to the Oppenheim 
proposition that any system of international law requires an equilibrium 
between states, seems to assert that such is the power of the United 
States that as a matter of fact the USA cannot be a party to international law 
because any consequent restraints are simply unreal and would have to 
depend for their effectiveness upon voluntary, but disadvantageous compliance. 
But within this proposition are two possible conclusions. If the USA 
is above and beyond international law, where does this leave lesser states? 
Either the entire system falls and international law, failing to constrain the 
mightiest, similarly fails to constrain any state with the power to reject 
constraints in any particular case with impunity; or international law retains 
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its distinctive character for all states but the United States. The first interpretation 
really is the nuclear interpretation. Every principle of international law 
would lose its legal character and fall back into the principles of international 
relations. The second suggests that lesser states continue to be bound by 
pacta sunt servanda and only the USA has impunity and immunity. Both 
cases have significant implications for the United States. 
In the first case the gain for the USA while obvious, also carries major 
dangers and difficulties. In moving from the international rule of law to 
power relationships unmediated by law, it may be expected that if the USA 
is to persuade other states to do its bidding, force, the threat of force will 
become a much more prominent part of US foreign policy – in itself an 
option with significant cost. In the second scenario where only the USA is 
outside of the international law regime, the perils are hardly less. The 
hypocrisy of the greatest power exempting itself from the rules of international 
law while requiring the compliance of other states is also a dangerous 
position. It may be possible, at a cost, to police such a system if the USA 
really believed it to be in its interests so to do. But when second-order states 
seek to follow the principle espoused by the USA then, for all its power, the 
position of the USA could not regularly prevail. 
The second and more limited meaning concerning exceptionalism suggests 
that because of its power (and perhaps other reasons such as the US Constitution 
and its federal structure) the United States either must necessarily be, 
or should be, in a position to accept the rules of international law with a 
discretion not appropriate to other states. Two examples are pertinent. The 
USA might argue that notwithstanding the number of states that have already 
signed and ratified the treaty creating the International Criminal Court, with 
its overtones of the acceptance of universal jurisdiction, its own exceptional 
international responsibilities and powers, together with its confidence in its 
own special needs and abilities mean that it must claim exemption for itself 
alone. This in no sense condones war crimes or crimes against humanity. It 
simply asserts that for the USA, this is more appropriately dealt with in its 
own domestic jurisdiction. Even with the Kyoto Protocol on Climate 
Change the argument might be, that given the explicit intention of the 
Defense Strategy to remain the supreme power, it is inappropriate for the 
USA to risk any lessening of its industrial power, regardless of environmental 
cost. Of course both these examples have many arguments in favour of 
compliance and many of the problems of hypocrisy remain, but some 
argument is perhaps maintainable. 
Koh (2003), in his analysis distinguishes four manifestations of American 
exceptionalism which range from the least problematic to that deserving of 
the most opprobrium. It is clear that Bolton’s arguments as discussed so far 
all fall within one or more of these. Koh seems to assume that exceptionalism 
is much more limited in its effect than we have suggested – or at least Bolton 
has argued. For Koh the two most difficult facets of exceptionalism concern 
first what Louis Henkin called ‘America’s flying buttress mentality’. By this 
Henkin meant that the USA often identified with the values expressed in 
international human rights documents, and indeed, often in fact complied 
with their requirements, yet this country was unwilling to subject itself to 
the critical examination processes provided in such Conventions. The effect 
was external support (like a flying buttress) but not the internal support of 
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a pillar. In other words the USA was willing to comply (and in fact did) but 
would not want to recognize any external authority as having the power to 
examine and judge its conduct. Just as in Bolton’s example of President 
Clinton unnecessarily quoting external authority for his actions following 
the Senate’s rejection of the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Convention (CTBC), so here the argument is that compliance without ratification 
has some advantages for the USA. One sees a parallel too in the US 
decision to intervene in Afghanistan post-9/11, without the authority of a 
Security Council Resolution, notwithstanding the fact that it would almost 
certainly have been forthcoming. The USA does not want to look beyond its 
borders for the authority for domestic or foreign policy choices. Koh’s view 
is that the result of this is that the USA often receives unnecessary condemnation, 
and sometimes pariah status, for appearing to align itself with other 
states not ratifying, or not complying with, conventions – states with 
appalling human rights records. 
The real problem of exceptionalism, however, according to Koh (2003) 
arises when the USA uses its power to promote a double standard by which 
it is proposed ‘that a different rule should apply to itself than applies to the 
rest of the world’: 
Recent well-known examples include such diverse issues as the International 
Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, executing juvenile 
offenders or persons with mental disabilities, declining to implement orders of 
the International Court of Justice, with regard to the death penalty, or claiming 
a Second Amendment exclusion from a proposed global ban on the illicit 
transfer of small arms and light weapons. In the post 9/11 environment, further 
examples have proliferated: America’s attitudes toward the global justice 
system, holding Taliban detainees on Guantanamo without Geneva Convention 
hearings, and asserting a right to use force in pre-emptive self-defence. 
(p. 1486) 
In our view the first two examples – the ICC and the Kyoto Protocol – 
should be distinguished from the rest because in those cases the USA did not 
(publicly) accept the usefulness of either for the world as a whole or for the 
United States. But for the rest the problem is not only the appearance of 
hypocrisy but the reality. For the USA to ignore ICJ decisions (the only 
nation to have done so), and to assert that it may continue to act in a way 
contrary to internationally accepted standards because of its constitutional 
validation leaves open similar arguments to every pariah state in the world. 
While the US response is that these other states do not have similar democratic 
validation, this has no necessary truth. 
 
BOLTON’S ARGUMENTS ABOUT INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Some of the foregoing has already touched upon the status and quality of 
public international law. But it is necessary now to look specifically at 
Bolton’s views. To an international lawyer, educated both to accept the reality 
international law and to assume its significant benefits for the world 
community, Bolton makes uncomfortable, and occasionally disconcerting 
reading. On the other hand it does seem that his arguments are informed and 
driven by the conclusions he has already reached. His views against globalism 
would be scarcely sustainable without a view of international law which 
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it overwhelmingly as international relations by another name. Believing 
he does in the obvious superiority of US democracy under the US Constitution 
to all other legitimations, he has little alternative but to reduce international 
law to a considerably inferior status. 
At the beginning of this article it was observed that Bolton’s understanding 
of the meaning of law is very much of the positivist kind. John Austin’s 
Victorian understanding of law as commands from a sovereign (in the widest 
sense) backed by the threat or use of coercion, sanctions or force, is also 
Bolton’s.12 That being so, the rules of international law ‘destitute of sanctioning 
force which is the distinguishing quality of law’ seem to be reduced 
something much less – perhaps even mere rhetoric, as Bolton suggests. But 
perhaps even as stated in 1880, that view may indeed ‘unduly depreciate the 
actual force and effect of the system as a whole’ (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
1880, Volume XIII: 190). 
Bolton’s attack on international law is comprehensive. It is an attack on 
treaty law and customary international law, along with the other usually 
claimed sources of international law as found in Article 38 of the Statute of 
International Court of Justice of 1945. 
As readers will be aware, almost all international lawyers and all state 
governments are in agreement that at the heart of international law is the 
crucial principle of pacta sunt servanda (usually loosely translated as ‘agreements 
or promises are to be honoured’). Acceptance of this principle is one 
immediate means of distinguishing international law from international 
relations. It is because it is a legal principle that it is generally accepted uncritically. 
This, however, does not mean that a state will invariably comply 
with the principle, just as in domestic jurisdiction not all will obey all laws. 
two obvious points need to be made. First, the fact of occasional noncompliance 
in the domestic realm does not negate the law. The same is true 
internationally. Second, internationally even if there is no direct sanction, the 
price of breaking treaty obligations will rarely be cost free, though it may be 
nothing more than a level of opprobrium from other states, or a hesitancy 
upon their part to enter into future international legal relations. Universally 
accepted though this is, Bolton disputes it. When Bolton claimed in 1997 that 
regardless of the UN Charter, the USA was not bound to pay its dues, the 
response from Robert F. Turner (1997) of the University of Virginia Law 
School was as follows: 
How do we know that international treaty commitments are legally binding? 
Because every single one of the 185 [now more] states that are members of the 
United Nations, and every one of the few states that are not, acknowledge that 
fact. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties recognizes the 
fundamental and historic principle of pacta sunt servanda: ‘Every treaty in force 
is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.’ 
To be sure, like some of our own citizens, members of the international 
community of states do on occasions violate their legal obligations. But when 
they do, they never assert that treaty commitments are merely non-binding 
‘political’ undertakings. Stalin, Hitler, Kim Il Sung, Gadhafi and Saddam 
Hussein all either denied the allegations against them, pretended that their acts 
of flagrant international aggression were really in ‘self-defence’ to a prior attack 
by their victims, or proffered some other legal basis for their conduct. Not one 
of them asserted that treaties ‘were not binding,’ because they realized that no 
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country would accept such a patently spurious assertion – it simply would not 
pass the straight-face test. (cited in J. Murphy, 2004: 11) 
Why then does Bolton want to argue that treaties are not legally binding 
upon the USA and what are the implications? There are two aspects to his 
arguments here. The first is concerned with the status of treaties in the international 
world, and the second with the status of treaties within the domestic 
jurisdiction of the USA. Internationally it is the lack of sanction which 
persuades Bolton that the obligation to comply can only be moral or political 
(neither to be underestimated but, he says, not to be confused with the 
legal). If one accepts his premiss that it is only the threat or use of sanctions 
which makes an obligation legal, then his argument is irrefutable. Few would 
accept the premiss. Legality is not in essence necessarily linked with sanction 
or punishment. Rather most lawyers would accept that the legal quality arises 
from the universal acceptance of the legal aspect. This is not as circular as it 
sounds. It is because of the acceptance of the legal quality of pacta sunt 
servanda that overwhelmingly most states, almost all of the time, accept their 
treaty obligations automatically, and only very rarely subject them to unilateral 
reconsideration. Bolton attempts to avoid this argument by emphasizing 
that his position does not mean that the USA should not ordinarily 
comply with its treaty obligations, only that it need not do so. With this 
position the debate might seem to be purely semantic, arising from his understanding 
of the term ‘legal’. It is more than that, simply because by avoiding 
ascribing the term ‘legal’ Bolton hopes both to elevate the US right to ignore 
treaties, and to downgrade the need for compliance. 
Bolton (2000c) effectively admits this intention when, having observed that 
‘In the rest of the world, international law and its “binding” obligations are 
taken for granted’ (p. 8), he goes on to observe of US citizens: 
When somebody says ‘That’s the law’, our inclination is to abide by that law. 
Thus if ‘international law’ is justifiably deemed ‘law’, Americans will act 
accordingly . . . On the other hand, if it is not law, it is important to understand 
that our flexibility and our policy options are not as limited as some would 
have us believe. It follows inexorably, therefore, that the rhetorical persuasiveness 
of the word ‘law’ is critically important. (p. 9) 
It is manifest then, and admitted, that the argument he makes is driven by 
the end he wishes to achieve: the return of international law to the political 
world. 
If, then, his arguments about the international obligations arising from 
treaties are specious, what of customary international law? For Bolton 
‘customary international law’ deserves, at the least, inverted commas expressing 
incredulity. Of course debates over customary international law are 
familiar and continuing (D’Amato, 1987; Byers, 1999) and there are problems 
in defining when customary international law comes into existence; there are 
difficulties in proving opinio juris; there are problems with the position of 
‘the persistent objector’; and there are problems with flexibility and 
malleability. Such nice jurisprudential questions have no place in Bolton’s 
mind. He denies the very existence of customary law. For him practice is 
practice, and custom is custom; neither one is law. 
Again this extraordinarily extreme position is driven by the conclusion 
which Bolton seeks, namely the view that the USA is not, and should not be, 
constrained in its policy decisions or conduct by any customary international 
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law whether in its international relations or domestically. Internationally, as 
explained in his discussion of the CTBC, Bolton’s view is that the USA must 
pursue its own path. If this path should coincide with what other states 
regard as customary international law that is well and good, but it is coincidence, 
not compliance. This is a point made also by Anderson (2001) with 
regard to anti-personnel mines and the banning thereof. While Anderson 
does not advocate the ratification of the Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, 
he argues that the random effect of such weapons means that the USA 
should choose not to use them while denying any developing customary 
international law. 
As with treaty law, any recognition of customary international law has 
both international and domestic significance and implications. This is 
particularly true in the area of human rights. Bolton’s fear is that through 
means other than internal democratic approval, changes in standards created 
by ‘the international community’ might affect the USA. Thus internally he 
fears, for instance, that US courts could (though he approves the fact that 
they have generally not) look to developing international customary law in 
determining whether the US death penalty might constitute cruel or unusual 
punishment. Internationally the effect might be to incur international legal 
condemnation for acts seen by the US administration as necessary for its own 
security or interests. 
The contrast of international and national effect of the status of treaties is 
well illustrated by Bolton’s arguments with regard to the UN Charter and in 
particular with the US obligation to fund the UN in accordance with the 
Charter provisions. The UN Charter (representing a ‘political deal’ rather 
than a ‘legal obligation’ according to Bolton) was signed by the 50 nations 
represented at the United Nations Conference on International Organizations 
on June 26, 1945.13 The UN came into existence on 24 October 1945 
after ratification by the five permanent members of the Security Council and 
by a majority of the other 46 signatories. In the case of the USA, the Senate 
gave its consent to ratification by 89 votes to 2 on 28 July 1945. In December 
of that year the Senate and the House of Representatives unanimously voted 
to request that the UN’s headquarters be located in the USA. 
Given that Article VI, Clause 2 (the ‘Supremacy Clause’) of the Constitution 
of the USA states: 
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in 
pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the 
judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or 
laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding . . . 
it might have been concluded that the provisions of the Charter fairly clearly 
form part of the ‘supreme law of the land’. The very fact that the USA has 
remained in arrears, paid (partially) only when conditions not to be found in 
the Charter were met, and restricted the activities to which it was prepared 
to contribute, does perhaps bolster Bolton’s position in realist, if not legal 
terms. The truth is that although the Charter obligation to pay dues as 
assessed14 seems clear (if inferable), the USA has rejected its obligation 
without direct penalty. As has been argued, however, this does not affect the 
legality of the position, only its enforceability and, although the US administration 
would claim to be indifferent to this effect, it has certainly not raised 
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the USA in the perception of other states, and particularly in the perception 
of those who have contributed proportionally a much greater percentage of 
the UN budget than the US. In the words of The Netherlands’ permanent 
representative in the UN speaking to the Security Council on 30 March 2000: 
The United Nations cannot survive without the United States, and that is why 
we cooperate and why we agree that a solution has to be found. 
But it should be clear that we are not cooperating because we think your 
arguments are valid, but simply because we feel that the United States has to 
not only stay in the United Nations, but has to be a committed, influential 
member. So we are not – I just want to make that clear – we are not persuaded 
by your arguments, but by our enlightened self-interest. (J. Murphy, 2004: 136) 
 
JOHN BOLTON’S ATTITUDE TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS: THE HUMAN RIGHTS EXAMPLE 
 
It is now necessary to consider the effects of Boltonian jurisprudence to 
demonstrate that this is no mere academic discussion. Given Bolton’s 
appointment as the US Ambassador to the UN it seems appropriate to exemplify 
the results of his theoretical position (even when held by others) by 
discussing some aspects of US human rights policy. 
It will have become obvious that Bolton’s denial of legal status, at least for 
the US, to so-called international law is absolute. But with what are we left 
in the international regulation of affairs? Bolton’s view is that the world of 
international relations must remain political rather than legal. Of course it has 
always been the case that the effect of translating political (or social) disputes 
into legal disputes is (at least theoretically) to negate the difference in power 
of the protagonists. The essence of the rule of law is that the parties are equal 
in the dispute before the law. And just as in domestic law all people are equal 
before the law, so too in international law sovereign equality dictates the same 
formal equality. This is one reason why many neo-conservatives and their 
allies have mounted an attack upon sovereign equality.15 But as has been 
argued elsewhere, this formal equality has very little effect beyond international 
law and the votes of the General Assembly. It certainly does not 
operate in the Security Council, in the World Bank or in the International 
Monetary Fund: 
The crucial respect in which formal equality between states is still valid, is of 
course in international law. It may be that this is one reason why so few 
powerful states have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice in their international disputes. The strength and weakness of 
the ICJ is that, as in other courts, all parties appear as equals in the legal dispute. 
No state has advantage because it has power. Of course this does mean that 
powerful states hesitate before appearing before international courts for that 
very reason. The removal of sovereign equality of states would effectively end 
the role and the rule of law in international relations. The whole raison d’être 
of law has been to escape from the ‘might is right’ way of understanding the 
world. (Mansell, 2004: 454; see also Kahn, 2001) 
In addition, perhaps paradoxically, the USA has been at the forefront of those 
states attempting to create an international legal regime intended to further 
the cause of free trade (‘free trade’ at least as defined by the US administration). 
The USA has in general been prepared to participate in the distinctly 
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legal dispute-resolution mechanism of the World Trade Organization. It has 
enthusiastically backed attempts to legalize international protection of intellectual 
property rights, and has demanded in legal terms access for its goods 
and services into states with which it enjoys regulated trading status. 
It is this blatant and political ambivalence towards international law that 
further undercuts Bolton’s position. His reply would probably be that international 
trade law is very different from international human rights law. The 
former is intended to further the interests of the USA, the latter, and related 
areas, are intended to constrain the USA and to prevent it from freely taking 
political decisions validated by constitutional democracy. Bolton is always at 
pains to observe, with amazed dismay, the readiness of European states to 
voluntarily surrender significant aspects of sovereignty to a central (and 
arguably undemocratic) European Union, and the consequent predisposition 
to enter into sovereignty-limiting treaties. 
What is the significance of this argument, reducing international law to 
international politics for the US role in the international definition, promotion 
and protection of human rights? We would argue that we have already seen 
some unfortunate results, and that the Boltonian approach to international 
law, often reflected in US administration policy has been little short of 
disastrous both for the international protection of human rights and also for 
the United States itself. Underlying the approach is always the argument that 
international law seeks to curb the power of the USA. There is no recognition 
that international treaties concerning human rights are intended to be 
for the benefit of all. 
A prime example has been the decision of the US government to apply the 
Geneva Convention selectively when dealing with those it believes to be 
involved in acts of terror. Shortly after Congress authorized the use of force 
against those believed to be involved in the 9/11 attacks, the President authorized 
the detention of anyone he had ‘reason to believe’ was a member of 
Al Qaeda or involved in acts of international terrorism against the United 
States (Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War 
Against Terrorism, 13 November 2001, reproduced in Greenberg and Dratel, 
2005: 25). As observed by Fletcher (2002) this Order is peculiar in seemingly 
giving power to George W. Bush personally. Pursuant to this order, about 
550 ‘enemy combatants’, some of whom were captured in locations far away 
from active combat in Afghanistan and Iraq, have been taken to the ‘legal 
black hole’ (Steyn, 2004: 1) at Guantánamo Bay. The government claims it is 
entitled to detain them until the war on terrorism ends or until the executive 
‘in its sole discretion’ decides they no longer threaten national security (In 
re Guantanamo Detainee Case [2005]: 39–40). Some of the detainees have 
been selected for trial for violations of the laws of war before military 
commissions, which while according them more rights than some other 
Guantanamo detainees, is legally problematic if they enjoy protected person 
status under the Geneva Convention (see Koh, 2002; Mundis, 2002, 2004; 
Ratner and Ray, 2004). 
In a revelationary article published in The New York Times (Golden, 2004) 
there is an insight into just how the decisions were taken to deal with those 
apprehended who were in fact taken to Guantanamo, and also those apprehended 
in the USA and suspected of terrorist involvement. When the deputy 
White House counsel sought advice from the Justice Department’s Office of 
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Legal Counsel (OLC) on ‘the legality of the use of military force to prevent 
or deter terrorist activity inside the United States’ the response was drafted 
by John Yoo, a Bush appointee with ‘a reputation as perhaps the most intellectually 
aggressive among a small group of conservative legal scholars who 
had challenged what they saw as the United States’ excessive deference to 
international law’. Yoo’s advice of 21 September was not protective of civil 
liberties. 
In the planning for the military tribunals it is reported that while most of 
the government’s experts in military and international law were left out of 
discussions, in a memorandum drafted by Patrick Philbin (a deputy in the 
Justice Department’s legal counsels’ office) on 6 November 2001, it was 
suggested that the 9/11 attacks were ‘“plainly sufficient” to warrant applying 
the laws of war’. But, it was added, the White House would be entitled to 
apply international law selectively. ‘It stated specifically that trying terrorists 
under the laws of war “does not mean that terrorists will receive the protections 
of the Geneva Conventions or the rights that laws of war accord to 
lawful conduct”’ (Golden, 2004). 
Central to enemy combatant status is the purported non-applicability of 
the third Geneva Convention, even though the convention does not recognize 
enemy combatant status as such, but only the categories of combatants 
and non-combatants (Roberts, 2004: 742). Correspondence between the 
Department of Justice and the Department of State reveals fundamental 
disagreement between William H. Taft, legal adviser to the Secretary of State 
and ‘a small, hawkish group of politically appointed lawyers’ (Mayer, 2005)16 
of the Department of Justice, as to the applicability of international humanitarian 
law to Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees and ultimately as to the nature 
of international law and its relationship with US domestic law. Taft disagreed 
with the OLC’s determination that the President could interpret the third 
Geneva Convention as inapplicable to Taliban detainees eliminating the need 
for a tribunal required ‘in case of doubt’ by article 5 of the third Geneva 
Convention, a determination which was set out in, among other documents, 
a memo of 22 January signed by Jay S. Bybee (Memorandum for Alberto R. 
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes II, General 
Counsel of the Department of Defense, Re Application of Treaties and Laws 
to Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, 22 January 2002, reproduced in Greenberg 
and Dratel, 2005: 107). Taft (2002a: 2) had challenged this conclusion 
also contained in an earlier draft in a letter to John Yoo. While the view taken 
by the OLC was that the Geneva Convention was inapplicable to Al Qaeda 
as a non-state actor, Taft considered that common article 3 continued to apply 
as ‘minimal standards applicable in any armed conflict’ (p. 4). The OLC 
advised that the power to suspend treaty obligations lay at the President’s 
discretion. If sought, however, justification could be found in the nature of 
Afghanistan as a failed state (Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, 
Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the 
Department of Defense, Re Application of Treaties and Laws to Al Qaeda 
and Taliban Detainees, 22 January 2002, reproduced in Greenberg and 
Dratel, 2005: 91), a conclusion which Taft (2002a: 4) had disputed both in 
principle and as a matter of fact, as the notion of a failed state for him was a 
political and not a legal concept. More fundamentally, Taft and the lawyers 
of the Department of Justice disagreed as to the effect of international law in 
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‘domestic decision making’. The advice emanating from the Department of 
Justice was that the validity of suspending the Geneva Convention at 
international law had ‘no bearing on domestic constitutional issues’ but was 
‘worth consideration as a means of justifying the actions of the United States 
in the world of international politics’ (Memorandum for Alberto R. 
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes II, General 
Counsel of the Department of Defense, Re Application of Treaties and Laws 
to Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, 22 January 2002, reproduced in Greenberg 
and Dratel, 2005: 102). Furthermore the nation’s right to self-defence 
could not be overridden by treaty, nor did customary international law ‘bind 
the President or the US Armed Forces in their decision concerning the detention 
conditions of al Qaeda and Taliban prisoners’ (p. 116). Customary international 
law certainly could not constrain the Commander-in-Chief: 
Importing customary international law notions concerning armed conflict 
would represent a direct infringement on the President’s discretion as the 
Commander in Chief and Chief Executive to determine how best to conduct 
the Nation’s military affairs. (pp. 115–16) 
For Taft (2002b), however, domestic law could not relieve the United States 
of its international obligations. That he and the Department of Justice 
officials appeared to be talking past each other can be seen the following way 
they responded to his concerns: 
You have more expertise than our Office in judging whether certain international 
legal argument will be accepted by the international public opinion 
and different international organizations. In fact, we wish to make clear that 
this Office has no interest or competence in commenting on such policies. But 
we are afraid that your approach has confused law with policy, in which the 
decision makers may legitimately concern themselves with the effects of international 
public opinion. Those concerns, however, have no place as a matter of 
interpreting the domestic legal effect of Article II treaties, just as they would 
have no place in the interpretation of constitutional or statutory provisions. 
(Yoo and Delahunty, 2002) 
The views of the lawyers of the Department of Justice, entirely consistent with 
Bolton’s views of international law, prevailed. On 7 February 2002 the President, 
expressly referring to a Department of Justice memorandum and a letter 
from Attorney General John Ashcroft determined that Taliban and Al Qaeda 
detainees were not entitled to prisoner-of-war status but to humane treatment 
consistent with the Geneva Convention in so far as ‘appropriate and consistent 
with military necessity’ (Humane Treatment of Al Qaeda and Taliban 
Detainees, 7 February 2002, reproduced in Greenberg and Dratel, 2005: 135). 
What does not seem to have been understood (or at least accepted) by the 
OLC was that the Geneva Conventions were drafted to be a code in the interests 
of all. Objecting to the kind of ‘flying buttress mentality’ that Koh 
describes, Taft (2002c) wrote to Gonzales: 
Basically, it seems to me the issue here is whether we want to admit that we are 
carrying out our commitments under international law or assert that we are not 
required to do so while following an identical course of conduct. I fail to see 
the advantage in repudiating our treaty obligations when our actions conform 
to them. 
This selective application of the laws of war was resoundingly rejected by 
District Judge James Robertson in the case of Salim Ahmed Hamdan [2004] 
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on 10 November 2004: 
[t]he government’s attempt to separate the Taliban from Al Qaeda for Geneva 
Convention purposes finds no support in the structure of the Conventions 
themselves, which are triggered by the place of the conflict, and not by what 
particular faction a fighter is associated with. (p. 15) 
Hamdan, who had been captured in Afghanistan in 2001 and taken to Guantanamo 
Bay in 2002, was selected for trial by military commission and 
charged in July 2004. In habeas corpus proceedings he challenged the validity 
of military commissions and the nature and duration of his pre-trial detention. 
Judge Robertson held that Hamdan was entitled to the protections of 
the third Geneva Convention until a competent tribunal determined his 
status in accordance with article 5 of the third Geneva Convention and that 
trial before a military commission would be unlawful unless provisions on 
excluding the defendant and withholding evidence were amended. After the 
decision as reproduced on the JURIST (2004) website, the Department of 
Justice restated its belief in the legality and good policy of the administration’s 
approach towards the detainees: 
We believe the President properly determined that the Geneva Conventions 
have no legal applicability to members or affiliates of al Qaeda, a terrorist 
organization that is not a state and has not signed the Geneva Conventions. We 
also believe that the President’s power to convene military commissions to 
prosecute crimes against the laws of war is inherent in his authority as 
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and has been memorialised by 
Congress in statutes governing the military. 
By conferring protected legal status under the Geneva Conventions on 
members of Al Qaeda, the Judge has put terrorism on the same legal footing as 
legitimate methods of waging war. The Constitution entrusts to the President 
the responsibility to safeguard the nation’s security. The Department of Justice 
will continue to defend the President’s ability and authority under the Constitution 
to fulfil that duty. 
Subsequent events in this case are less important for our purposes than this 
illustration of the debate to which Boltonian notions of international law 
have led. 
The debate concerning permissible interrogation methods of those detained 
is no less significant. Initially, the opinion of the OLC on the applicability of 
the Torture Convention, incorporated by sections 2340–2340A of title 18 
of the US Code,17 to interrogations outside the USA, proceeded from an 
extremely restrictive understanding of torture. Only physical pain that was 
‘equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such 
as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death’ reached the 
relevant threshold of physical pain. Mental pain must result in ‘significant 
psychological harm of significant duration’ (Memorandum for Alberto R. 
Gonzales Counsel to the President, Re Standards of Conduct for Interrogation 
under 18 U.S.C. paras 2340–2340A, 1 August 2002, reproduced in Greenberg 
and Dratel, 2005: 172). It was advised consistently with the OLC 
approach towards the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, that 
the application of art 2340A to interrogations of enemy combatants ordered 
by the President would be unconstitutional. Finally, it was counselled that in 
[t]he government’s attempt to separate the Taliban from Al Qaeda for Geneva 
Convention purposes finds no support in the structure of the Conventions 
Kent Academic Repository – Kent Law School 
Published version available in Social Legal Studies 14:459 
- 19 - 
 
 
themselves, which are triggered by the place of the conflict, and not by what 
particular faction a fighter is associated with. (p. 15) 
Hamdan, who had been captured in Afghanistan in 2001 and taken to Guantanamo 
Bay in 2002, was selected for trial by military commission and 
charged in July 2004. In habeas corpus proceedings he challenged the validity 
of military commissions and the nature and duration of his pre-trial detention. 
Judge Robertson held that Hamdan was entitled to the protections of 
the third Geneva Convention until a competent tribunal determined his 
status in accordance with article 5 of the third Geneva Convention and that 
trial before a military commission would be unlawful unless provisions on 
excluding the defendant and withholding evidence were amended. After the 
decision as reproduced on the JURIST (2004) website, the Department of 
Justice restated its belief in the legality and good policy of the administration’s 
approach towards the detainees: 
We believe the President properly determined that the Geneva Conventions 
have no legal applicability to members or affiliates of al Qaeda, a terrorist 
organization that is not a state and has not signed the Geneva Conventions. We 
also believe that the President’s power to convene military commissions to 
prosecute crimes against the laws of war is inherent in his authority as 
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and has been memorialised by 
Congress in statutes governing the military. 
By conferring protected legal status under the Geneva Conventions on 
members of Al Qaeda, the Judge has put terrorism on the same legal footing as 
legitimate methods of waging war. The Constitution entrusts to the President 
the responsibility to safeguard the nation’s security. The Department of Justice 
will continue to defend the President’s ability and authority under the Constitution 
to fulfil that duty. 
Subsequent events in this case are less important for our purposes than this 
illustration of the debate to which Boltonian notions of international law 
have led. 
The debate concerning permissible interrogation methods of those detained 
is no less significant. Initially, the opinion of the OLC on the applicability of 
the Torture Convention, incorporated by sections 2340–2340A of title 18 
of the US Code,17 to interrogations outside the USA, proceeded from an 
extremely restrictive understanding of torture. Only physical pain that was 
‘equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such 
as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death’ reached the 
relevant threshold of physical pain. Mental pain must result in ‘significant 
psychological harm of significant duration’ (Memorandum for Alberto R. 
Gonzales Counsel to the President, Re Standards of Conduct for Interrogation 
under 18 U.S.C. paras 2340–2340A, 1 August 2002, reproduced in Greenberg 
and Dratel, 2005: 172). It was advised consistently with the OLC 
approach towards the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, that 
the application of art 2340A to interrogations of enemy combatants ordered 
by the President would be unconstitutional. Finally, it was counselled that in 
Although specifically limited by the Secretary of Defense to Guantanamo, and 
requiring his personal approval (given in only two cases), the augmented 
techniques for Guantanamo migrated to Afghanistan and Iraq where they were 
neither limited nor safeguarded. (p. 14) 
The result was that ‘[p]olicies approved for use on al Qaeda and Taliban 
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detainees, who were not afforded the protection of the Geneva Conventions, 
now applied to detainees who did fall under the Geneva Protections’ (p. 14). 
In attempting to restrict the effect of human rights and international 
humanitarian law, with only a Boltonian justification, the USA has both lost 
prestige and endangered its own citizens who might be captured by opposing 
forces, as recognized by Judge Robertson in Salim Ahmed Hamdan v 
Donald H. Rumsfeld [2004]: 
The government has asserted a position different from the positions and behaviour 
of the United States in previous conflicts, one that can only weaken the 
United States’ own ability to demand application of the Geneva Conventions 
to Americans captured during armed conflicts abroad. (p. 21) 
Few outside of the United States accept that Guantanamo with its prisoners 
operates within international human rights law (Borelli, 2004) – although this 
is insignificant if John Bolton’s position is to be accepted. 
The implications of Bolton’s position are also to be seen in the controversy 
in the USA over the International Criminal Court. The neo-conservatives 
have been at the forefront of those arguing not only for non-cooperation but 
also for action to prevent its operation. Bolton’s (2002) view on transitional 
justice is that: 
It is within national judicial systems where the international effort should be 
to encourage the warring parties to resolve questions of criminality as part of 
a comprehensive solution to their disagreements. Removing key elements of 
the dispute to a distant forum, especially the emotional and contentious issues 
of war crimes and crimes against humanity, undercuts the very progress that 
these peoples, victims and perpetrators alike, must make if they are ever to live 
peacefully together. 
This view appears to have influenced the establishment of the Iraqi Special 
Tribunal by the Iraqi Governing Council outside the existing structure of 
UN-sponsored international tribunals (whether hybrid or international). 
The problem, as Alvarez (2004) writes, is that: 
The Tribunal’s origins doom its legitimacy, not merely because it appears to be 
yet another instance of the Hegemon applying to others what it refuses to apply 
to itself. De-legitimating perceptions of hegemony, as well as risks of local 
noncooperation, 
arise from the suspicion that this Tribunal has taken the localized 
form that it has, not because Iraqis have genuinely insisted upon it, but because 
it suits US policy goals – including to undermine the ICC or to make it less 
likely that its number-one-defendant will be permitted to embarrass the US. 
(pp. 326–7) 
Among Bolton’s (2002) concerns are that binding the USA to the ICC ‘with 
its unaccountable Prosecutor and its unchecked judicial power, is clearly 
inconsistent with American standards of constitutionalism’ and that a ‘politically 
unaccountable Prosecutor’ could act ‘as part of an agenda to restrain 
American discretion, even when . . . actions are legitimated by the . . . constitutional 
system’. On 6 May 2002 the USA took the legally unprecedented 
step of ‘unsigning’ the Rome Statute, opening the way for it to act contrary 
to the Convention’s object and purpose (McGoldrick, 2004: 415). The USA’s 
attempt to achieve immunity from the jurisdiction of the ICC has been 
largely successful. Although Security Council Resolutions providing for the 
immunity from the Court of forces from non-ICC party states contributing 
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to UN operations (SCR 1422, 2002; SCR 1487, 2003) have not been renewed 
since the abuse of prisoners at Abu Grahib came to light, so-called ‘article 98 
bilateral agreements’ protecting US nationals from the ICC’s jurisdiction, 
have proved more successful, although still of questionable legality 




The argument of this article is that the world beyond the USA must now take 
seriously what in the past it might have chosen to ignore. What appeared to 
be an extreme – and rather esoteric – position calling into question the whole 
international law regime, is now arguably at the heart of the current US 
administration. While the implications of this phenomenon are not yet clear 
(almost certainly not even to the US administration) they will be substantial 
and will have a profound effect both on international relations and on the 
methods of diplomacy. The human rights examples confirm this but in other 
areas, especially the use of force in international relations, the changes may 
be even more profound. 
A final irony has to be observed. The neo-conservative assault on international 
law may well fuel the kind of globalism to which Bolton objects so 
forcefully. The claimed supremacy of the United States Constitution and 
the United States Presidency over international law greatly diminishes the 
weight of US participation in treaty and convention negotiations. The 
claimed superiority puts it beyond pacta sunt servanda but not always to its 
advantage. If it is want to remain beyond the reach of international law, this 
can only increase the urgency for international cooperation among all its 
economic, social and cultural competitors, not to mention those with different 




An early version of this article was presented at a conference at the Rothermere 
American Institute in Oxford in November 2004. The Institute’s support is much 
appreciated. 
 
1. We do not of course identify entirely or even largely with this ‘history’, nor 
yet would John Bolton, but we think it important for Europeans to recognize 
that superiority is too easily assumed. 
2. A sentiment recently expressed by Michael Ignatieff (2003): 
Being an imperial power, however, is more than being the most powerful 
nation or just the most hated one. It means enforcing such order as there 
is in the world and doing so in the American interest. It means laying down 
the rules America wants (on everything from markets to weapons of mass 
destruction) while exempting itself from other rules (the Kyoto Protocol 
on climate change and the International Criminal Court) that go against 
its interest. 
3. Significantly naming the chapter concerned with international law in Politics 
Among Nations, ‘The Main Problems of International Law’. 
4. This concept is one most reviled by the neo-conservatives (Glennon, 2001). 
For an excellent discussion of the contemporary meaning and significance of 
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‘sovereign equality’, see Simpson (2004). 
5. The letter (available at: http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter. 
htm) was signed by many who had played a part in the administration of Ronald 
Reagan and/or the first Bush administration and who clearly considered that 
there remained unfinished business. The signatories included Elliot Abrams, 
John Bolton, Robert Kagan, Richard Perle, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul 
Wolfowitz (and indeed, Francis Fukuyama). 
6. For a substantial critique of this paper, see Pena (2003). 
7. Ignatieff (2003) puts it as follows: ‘A new international order is emerging, but 
it is designed to suit American imperial objectives. America’s allies want a 
multilateral order that will essentially constrain American power. But the 
empire will not be tied down like Gulliver with a thousand legal strings.’ 
8. A view of relevance to the subsequent decisions to intervene in Afghanistan 
post-9/11 without explicit UN authorization or even endorsement; and to the 
decision to invade Iraq, again without authorization. 
9. The principle of universal jurisdiction allows a state to exercise jurisdiction over 
persons accused of committing international crimes anywhere in the world, 
irrespective of the nationality of the perpetrator, or, indeed, the victim(s). 
10. For interesting (if self-serving) US perspectives on universal jurisdiction, see 
Kissinger (2001) and for a spirited reply, see Roth (2001). 
11. Over 200 NGOs attended the Rome Conference on the International 
Criminal Court. See the website of the NGO Coalition for the International 
Criminal Court at http://www.iccnow.org/romearchive.html. 
12. ‘To start, let us define in summary fashion what, at least in the United States, 
“law” is commonly understood to be. We understand “law” to be a system of 
commands, obligations and rules that regulate relations among individuals and 
associations, and the sources of legitimate coercive authority in society. These 
are the forces that can compel behaviour and enforce compliance with rules’ 
(Bolton, 2000c: 2). 
13. As many as 1200 NGOs participated at San Francisco. Their role, especially in 
ensuring that the United Nations Charter incorporated human rights concerns, 
was unprecedented. The importance of their contribution was acknowledged 
by US Secretary of State after the conference (Charnovitz, 1997: 251–2). 
14. Article 17 states: 
1. The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the 
Organization. 
2. The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as 
apportioned by the General Assembly. 
3. The General Assembly shall consider and approve any financial and 
budgetary arrangements with specialized agencies referred to in Article 57 
and shall examine the administrative budgets of such specialized agencies 
with a view to making recommendations to the agencies concerned. 
15. For an attack on the concept, see Glennon (2003a) and the slightly longer (and 
slightly more circumspect) version of this piece (Glennon, 2003b). The 
additional circumspection seems to come from the difficulties being experienced 
in administering a conquered Iraq (Mansell, 2004). 
16. Correspondence between Taft and Yoo, including previously unreleased 
material obtained by Mayer, can be found on The New Yorker website at www. 
newyorker.com/online/content/?050214on_onlineonly02. 
17. According to S 2340, torture is ‘committed by a person acting under the color 
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of law specifically intended to inflict severe pain or suffering (other than pain 
or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his 
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